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SWIMMING FROM THE ISLAND OF THE
COLORBLIND: DESERTING AN ILL-CONCEIVED
CONSTITUTIONAL METAPHOR
Chris K. fijima*
No birds sing on Guam.' Indeed, no birds exist at all on the island; at
the end of the Second World War, tree climbing brown snakes, hidden in
the hold of an American Navy ship, found that they had no predators in the
indigenous fauna.2 And now that the birds have long since disappeared, the
fruit bats' inevitable fate looms each night.
3
On general (historical) principle, I am wary of White men traveling to
distant shores, and I approach, with care, written descriptions of what these
men find. More often than not, they see the world through the prisms of
their own fantasies and preferences. Indeed, when Oliver Sacks4 went in
search of the "island of the colorblind," he was appalled at the role that
canned meats, particularly Spain, played in the diet of the Marshallese and
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I. See OLIVER SACKS, THE ISLAND OF THE COLORBLIND AND CYCAD ISLAND 154 (1996)
[hereinafter SACKS, ISLAND].
2. Id. The brown tree snake has left the forests of Guam "profoundly silent." Harry E.
Demarest, An Ecological Whodunit, S.F. CHRON., July 17, 1994, Sunday Review at 4 (reviewing
and quoting MARK JAFFE, AND NO BIRDS SING (1994)).
3. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note 1.
4. Oliver Sacks is a medical doctor who the New York Times calls "[a]n explorer of that
most wondrous of islands, the human brain .. " D.M. Thomas, The Mind's Eye, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1997, at 7. His writings chronicle his work exploring "strange and wondrous neurolog-
ical conditions." Id. The descriptions chronicled in THE ISLAND OF THE COLORBLIND by Dr.
Sacks are of places and people defiled and uprooted first by generations of Europeans, later by
Japanese, and finally by Americans. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note i, at 129-34. For example, he
recounts how Johnston Island has become a depot for tons of mustard and nerve gas. The gasses
are periodically incinerated, releasing a permanent haze of dioxin and other noxious gases such
that the U.S. military personnel on the island must wear aluminized suits. Id. at 17-18. He also
discusses how whole populations of Pacific Islanders have been removed from Bikini and
Rongelap to allow the U.S. to perform nuclear tests on their island. Id. at 22. See also infra note
32.
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Micronesians. 5 A diet of taro, bananas, pandanus, breadfruit, yams, tuna,
papaya, and coconuts-all readily available on the island-was more "to
[his] taste.' '6  Thus, he wondered why "all the peoples of the Pacific,
seemingly, could fall so helplessly, so voraciously, on this stuff, despite its
intolerable cost to their budgets and their health?" 7 Incredibly, in search of
an explanation, he gave some credence to a hypothesis of another Western
traveler who believed the islanders' fondness for Spain was the result of the
"corpsy flavor" of the product due to a tradition of cannibalism.8 Indeed,
he mused about this theory in relation to the "addiction" of the Pingelapese
to the meat even though he admitted "there was no tradition of cannibalism
on Pingelap."
9
There was no discussion that, perhaps like people in other cultures,
the Pingelapese Islanders found that meat had an attractive flavor, it varied
their diet, and, when canned, it could be easily stored and transported.
Moreover, unacknowledged was the obvious fact that processed meats like
Spam were developed in the United States where there is no "traditional"
affinity for "corpse-like flavors."
10
This inability to filter out cultural prejudices and assumptions infects
even those who are aware of their own alienage. In 1958, anthropologist
Clifford Geertz and his wife visited a Balinese village.1' The couple was
not acknowledged by the inhabitants of the village until about ten days
after their arrival. It happened that an illegal cockfight was scheduled in
the center of the village, and Geertz and his wife went to watch it. In the
midst of the contest, a police raid scattered the spectators and participants.
Geertz and his wife ran as well, eventually ducking into the living
compound of a fellow spectator and fugitive. When the police came to the
house looking for participants, their host leaped to the defense of the
couple. He proclaimed they were visiting American professors, and had
been sitting in the compound throughout the afternoon drinking tea while
discussing Balinese culture. Hearing the alibi, the police left.
5. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note 1, at 22-23. It is important to note at the outset that Dr.
Sacks is cited primarily herein for his medical expertise and not for his political, cultural, or
anthropological insight.
6. Id. at 48.
7. Id. at 49.
8. Id. (quoting Paul Theroux).
9. Id.
10. My sansei (third generation Japanese American) friends from Hawaii all favor Spain
teriyaki and Spam rice balls (omusubi). As far as I know, there is no cannibalistic tradition in
Japanese American history-yet.
11. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 412-17 (1973).
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Geertz recounts how the next morning the entire village suddenly
welcomed and became interested in their two guests. He remarked at the
turnabout and attributed it mainly to the fact that when confronted by the
police, "we [the Geertzes] had not simply 'pulled out our papers' . . . and
asserted our Distinguished Visitor status . ,"2 It is noteworthy that
Geertz's recollection of the incident contains no acknowledgment that the
reason the villagers might have felt solidarity with him was not due to the
couple's "self-sacrifice" and refusal to assert their privileged status to the
police-a status, I suspect, that was facially apparent to the police. The
simpler explanation may have been that the goodwill resulted from the
couple providing an alibi for their erstwhile host and showing solidarity
with his situation.'
3
Sacks' musings about Spam and Geertz's interpretation of his
Balinese experience point to more vexing questions: How much are the
vagaries of our perception predetermined in some "innocent" sense by our
limited experience-how much do we choose to ignore by rationalization
and denial; and, do the differences really matter? Indeed, Justice John
Marshall Harlan, in his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 5 wrote how
our "[c]onstitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. ' 6 Yet, in that very same dissent he argued that the Chi-
12. Id. at 416.
13. Even Geertz acknowledges the imprecision of anthropological interpretation:
In short, anthropological writings are themselves interpretations, and second and
third order ones to boot. (By definition, only a "native" makes first order ones: it's
his culture.) They are, thus, fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are "something
made," "something fashioned" ... not that they are false, unfactual, or merely "as
if" thought experiments.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 15 (1973) (footnote omitted). Sacks notes that an anthropologist
"tends to treat an indigenous chant or rite as an object, and may not be able to enter its
inwardness, its spirit, the perspective of those who actually sing it." SACKS, ISLAND, supra note
1, at 212-13.
14. Sacks writes of another patient who, as a result of an enormous brain tumor, was totally
blind, and apparently had no conscious knowledge that he could not see. He "had lost the very
idea of seeing." OLIVER SACKS, The Last Hippie, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 49 (1995)
[hereinafter SACKS, Last Hippie]. It was a condition Sacks calls a "singular blindness to his
blindness ... no longer knowing what 'seeing' or 'looking' meant .... Id.
Similarly, Sacks writes of patients who, after massive strokes in their right cerebral
hemisphere, lose not only the sensation on their left sides, but also the concept of "leftness."
OLIVER SACKS, The Case of the Colorblind Painter, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 13 n.6
(hereinafter SACKS, Colorblind Painter]. They are "anosognosic"-they have no knowledge of
their loss so the world is whole and complete although others may say it is bisected. Id.
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, so noteworthy is his dissent that some have
posited the possibility that Justice Harlan had African American relatives. See James Gordon,
1997]
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nese are "a race so different from our own that we do not permit those
belonging to it to become citizens of the United States."' 17 Indeed, Harlan
was offended by the very notion that the statute would not allow Blacks
equal access but would allow a "Chinaman [to] ride in the same passenger
coach with white citizens .. ,,18
Clearly, neither an end to racial hierarchy nor the elimination of racial
superiority was Harlan's concern.19 Yet, the assumption that the nation's
racial vision should metamorphosize into a kind of colorblindness, in light
of the intense racial reality of American life, has become a constitutional
catch phrase.20  However, the Plessy "colorblind" metaphor may be inap-
propriate,- not only in the context of the dissent, but in its construction.--
Did the First Justice Harlan Have A Black Brother?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 159 (1993).
17. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561.
18, Id. For a comprehensive treatment of Harlan's Plessv dissent in the context of the anti-
Chinese jurisprudence of his other work, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessv Myth: Justice Harlan
and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. I (forthcoming 1997). Professor Chin explores how
legal scholars and jurists have used Harlan's "colorblind" language to support various approaches
to race issues, but never fully address Harlan's equal protection analysis in the light of his
obvious anti-Chinese sentiment.
19. Chin. supra note 18, at 9.
20. See. e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993) (referring to appellants' desire for
a "color-blind electoral process"); see also Chin, supra note 18, at 2-4 (listing those in the
judiciary, the academy, and the popular media who have used the "colorblind" language in
Harlan's Plessy dissent to either oppose or support affirmative action); Carroll Rhodes, Changing
the Constitutional Guarantee of Voting Rights From Color-Consciousness to Color-Blind:
Judicial Activism by the Rehnquist Court, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 309, 341 (1996) (noting that when
the Court struck down the majority African American electoral districts in North Carolina, it was
the "'first time a majority of the Court tacitly recognized the concept of a color-blind electoral
process"); Ronald Turner, The Dangers of Misappropriation: Misusing Martin Luther King. Jr. 's
Legacy to Prove The Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 107-110 (1996)
(documenting the use of the "colorblind" metaphor in judicial and scholarly debate).
21. Of course, when the context is "disability," the traditional fears and prejudices about the
disabled are intertwined in the discussion. It is the:
hidden but powerful component of any discussion about disabled people [which is]
... the usually unacknowledged and unconscious fear and prejudice... toward...
those who look and function differently ... [stemming] from the frightened belief
that disability inevitably means loss of control, social isolation, loss of an essential
part of one's humanity, and the related deep-seated anxiety that this could happen
to me. . . . At times, these fears and prejudices burst out in violent words and
deeds, but usually, and perhaps even more dangerously, they are masked by an
avowed compassion, contempt cloaking itself in paternalism.
Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia. Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES IN L. &
MED. 141, 141-42 (1987).
There is a larger discussion, unattempted here, of whether disability is a social
construction. See. e.g., id. at 147 (discussing an increasing effort on the part of the disabled and
their allies to emphasize a minority group perspective in which disability is defined as a social
rather than medical construction); Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 769, 770 (1992). "Like the notion of the poor, the concept of the disabled.., is a
social construct-a thing--consisting of specific ideals and discourses." Id.
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In fact, the metaphor is based on superficially implied assumptions about
colorblindness.23 Indeed, what is particularly ironic about the metaphor is
the lesson we can learn from the colorblind, that color is much more than
hue, is not translated by those who proclaim racial "colorblindness" into
the lesson that people of color can teach, that race is much more than
pigment.
THE ISLAND OF THE COLORBLIND
There is an island in the Pacific Ocean called Pingelap where the
finest weaver is a colorblind woman who learned the craft from her
colorblind mother.24 Inside her darkened hut she weaves mats of intricate
and subtle design from the fibers of palm fronds.25 These mats display
delicate patterns of differing luminances that are visible in the darkness of
the hut, but disappear when taken out into the sunlight. 
6
The phenomenon of total colorblindness first intrigued Oliver Sacks
after treating a patient who became colorblind following an automobile
Ironically, Sacks makes the assertion that, in some sense, "color" is a construction:
"These demonstrations [of Edwin Land in 19571 ... demonstrated a neurological truth-that
colors are not 'out there' in the world, nor (as classical theory held) an automatic correlate of
wavelength, but rather, are constructed by the brain." SACKS, Colorblind Painter, supra note 14,
at 24.
22. See infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
23. Professor Chin points out that there are two different perceptions of "colorblindness":
(1) a condition that prevents recognition of all color and (2) a condition which permits the
perception of black and white only and prevents the ability to distinguish certain colors. Chin,
supra note 18, at 34.
The critique of description and understanding racial categories solely in Black/White
terms is a well trodden area of legal and popular comment. See. e.g., TOMAS ALMAGUER,
RACIAL FAULT LINES 2 (1994); Robert S. Chang, TowardAn Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space. 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993);
Frank H. Wu. Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 225, 248 (1995); see also Tom Morganthau, What Color is Black?. NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 13, 1995, at 62 (commenting that the "binary approach toward race" is no longer relevant to
the nation's changing demographics-immigrants and "multiracials").
24. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note 1, at 44.
25. Id. Since achromatopes lack functional cones that are responsible for detecting color
and fine detail, they must depend on the rods in the eye which are distributed around the
periphery of the retina. Id. at 13. Rods cannot discriminate color, but are light sensitive. Id
Thus, achromatopes are almost blinded by bright light. Id.
26. Id. Sacks tells of the colorblind sister of his traveling companion, also an achromatope,
who knitted a jacket using only dim browns and purples for her patterns and images. SACKS,
ISLAND, supra note I, at 44. The images were almost invisible to those not colorblind, but quite
clear to the knitter who responded solely to the differing luminances of the patterns. Id. at 44-45.
"You have to be totally colorblind to see it," she remarked. Id. at 45.
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accident. 27 Sacks learned from a fellow physician about Pingelap Island,
where the population had a high incidence of achromatopsia, and decided
to investigate.28
Pingelap Island, a small coral atoll located about 180 miles from the
island of Pohnpei in Micronesia, consists of three islets forming a ring
around a central lagoon.29 The population of Pingelap originally settled
there about a millennium ago. The Pingelapese brought with them a
sophisticated social structure, an oral culture and mythology and a complex
language. In 1775, a huge typhoon wiped out over ninety percent of the
island's population leaving about twenty survivors. Yet within a few
decades, the population was reapproaching one hundred.31  Pingelap
children with achromatopsia, perhaps as a consequence of inbreeding, were
first noticed about 1820. One third of Pingelap's present population carry
the gene for "maskun," 33 and fifty-seven of the island's seven hundred resi-
dents are achromatopes. 34  Thus, on Pingelap, the incidence of color-
blindness is one in twelve in contrast to the worldwide average of one in
30,000.
35
For "color-normals," the island was almost a "confusion of greens,"
while for the colorblind, it was a "polyphony of brightnesses, tonalities,
shapes, and textures, easily identified and distinguished from each other."
36
When Sacks and his companions arrived on the island they were greeted by
their interpreter, James James, an achromatope. 37 Indeed, when James was
asked whether he could tell the difference between a ripe yellow banana
27. SACKS, Colorblind Painter, supra note 14, at 5-6.
28. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note 1, at 8, 28.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 36-37.
31. Id. at37.
32. Id. Sacks retells the Pingelap explanations for the condition. They recount how a god
became enamored of the wife of the ruler of the typhoon survivors and fathered the maskun
children. Id. at 53. Other explanations trace the condition to the curse of a Christian missionary
or alternatively to the forced labor of a number of the islanders in a German phosphate mine. Id.
at 53-54. As Dr. Sacks traveled to Pingelap with an achromatope companion from Scandinavia,
he noticed that the islanders began to suspect that maskun had been introduced by achromatopic
whalers from the far north who had landed on Pingelap and raped the island women, thereby
bringing a White man's curse to the island. Id. at 54. This suspicion is entirely consistent with
the history of the islands since White Europeans brought anumber of diseases such as smallpox
which wiped out half the population of Pohnpei in 1854, followed by epidemics of measles and
influenza. Id. at 78.
33. Maskun is the Pingelap term for achromatopsia. Id. at 37.
34. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note 1, at 38.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id. at31.
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and an unripe green one he responded by going to a banana tree and
selecting a bright green banana. The questioner gingerly ate a piece
expecting it to be unripe, but found it completely edible: "You see," said
James, "we don't just go by color. We look, we feel, we smell, we know-
we take everything into consideration, and you just take color!
'" 39
This is similar to the explanation of "color" by another achromatope
who lived far away from Pingelap in Berkeley, California. In a letter to
Sacks, she explained that, although she was totally colorblind, she still
experienced color in a very real way:
People say I must see in shades of gray ... but I don't think so.
The word gray has no more meaning for me than the word pink
or blue-in fact, even less meaning, because I have developed
inner concepts of color words like pink and blue .... I would be
willing to bet ... that if we [achromatopes] were tested along
with normals... we would be able to detect far more shades of
gray . . . .The world I see has so much more richness and
variety than black-and-white photos or TV shows . . . . My
vision is a lot richer than normals can imagine.
40
Likewise, the finest night fishermen in Pingelap are colorblind. Out
of the glare of the sunlight, twilight becomes a time when an
achromatope's visual acuity is at its height. On the island of Pingelap this
ability has concrete advantages:
It is common knowledge among the Pingelapese that those with
the maskun manage better at scotopic times--dusk and dawn,
and moonlit nights-and for this reason, they are often
employed as night fishers. And in this the achromatopes are
preeminent; they seem able to see the fish in their dim course
underwater, the glint of the moonlight on their outstretched fins
as they leap-as well as, or perhaps better than, anyone else.41
The fact that there is a rich texture to the "color" that achromatopes
see may be a revelation to those of us who are "color-normal," who see
only the immediate surface appearance of what we call color.42 For many
38. Id. at 32-33.
39. Id. at 33.
40. SACKS, Colorblind Painter, supra note 14, at 33 n.24.
41. SACKS, ISLAND, supra note 1, at 54-55.
42. An excerpt from a letter to Sacks by an achromatope gives a very different perspective
about color vision and what we in fact see. The writer notes, "Words like 'achromatopsia' dwell
only on what we lack. They give no sense of what we have, the sort of worlds we appreciate or
make for ourselves." Id. at 204 n.5. She continues:
All objects have unique qualities which can be savored. All can be looked at in
1997]
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"color-normals," the notion of colorblindness assumes a lack of appre-
ciation for color which is yet another example of the arrogance of domi-
nance and normalcy that cannot comprehend the nuances perceived by
those outside the norm. Indeed, it is the same way that the luxury of "racial
normalcy" allows Whites the comfortable fiction of a colorblind law.
43
In a completely different sense, for people of color whose lives are
affected daily by the circumstance of their color, the admonition that "the
nation is colorblind" is a denial of the very reality that has shaped the
context of their lives.44 Sacks tells of a painter, Jonathan I., who was born
"color normal" but, as the result of an automobile accident, lost all sense of
45color. In his new condition, the artist's world was disturbing, even
46appearing dirty. He saw people's flesh as grey, and had to close his eyes
47to eat because food took on a dull and unappetizing color. As a
consequence, Jonathan I. increasingly turned to black and white foods-
rice, black olives and yogurt.48 As time passed:
he particularly missed the brilliant colors of spring-he had
always loved flowers, but now he could only distinguish them
by shape or smell. The blue jays were brilliant no longer; their
blue, curiously, was now seen as pale grey. He could no longer
see the clouds in the sky, their whiteness, or off-whiteness as he
different lights and in different kinds of shadows. Dull finishes, shiny finishes,
textures, prints, transparent qualities-I scrutinized them all, up close, in my
accustomed way (which occurred because of my visual impairment but which, I
think, provided me with more multi-sensory impressions of things).
Id. at 207-08 n. 12.
43. Race has been constructed as a relationship and that construction in turn has allowed
races to be defined against one another. IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 165-67 (1995). Whiteness becomes the "positive mirror image to the
explicit negative identities imposed upon non-whites," and "the norm around which other races
are constructed." Id. at 167.
44. The myth of a colorblind society has been described as:
a fiction that shrinks our understanding of this country by avoiding the evidence of
those things seen just about everywhere-in our politics, our mass media, on our
menus, our campuses, our showroom floors, in our department stores, our malls,
our bureaucracies, the lobbies of our hotels, our movie theaters, at our airports, on
our highways, in our advertising.
Turner, supra note 20, at 115 (quoting Stanley Crouch).
45. SACKS, Colorblind Painter, supra note 14, at 3. Total colorblindness is called cerebral
achromatopsia. Id. at 4.
46. Sacks describes the painter's reaction: "It was not just that colors were missing, but that
what he did see had a distasteful, "dirty" look, the whites glaring, yet discolored and off-white,
the blacks cavernous--everything wrong, unnatural, stained, and impure." Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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saw them, being scarcely distinguishable from the azure, which
seemed bleached to a pale grey.
Thus, Jonathan I.'s first reactions to his new condition were extreme.
He became excruciatingly aware that color did indeed exist. Museums and
galleries, once places of great pleasure became unbearable, rainbows turned
into depressing semicircles in the sky, and his dreams were washed out and
dull. 50 Even music, which he previously experienced as a "rich tumult of
inner colors," lost its beauty.
s5
Unfortunately, the colorblind myth of racial vision confuses the
ideological end to racial hierarchy with what already exists.52 That is, the
prescriptive ideal of a "colorblind" society, in which racism and White
supremacy are eradicated, has been transformed by judicial fiat into "a
condition of societal denial," creating the illusion that racial hierarchy has
been eliminated.5 3 Indeed, "denial is a pervasive symptom of contempo-
rary American racism." 54  And, of course, the denial of reality merely
perpetuates the condition of racial subordination.
55
My son's Japanese-American friend was once excluded from a game
by a group of White, female classmates because she did not have blue eyes.
Her father and other parents of color, including myself, felt racial pain
when we heard what happened. The White girls' parents were upset about
her exclusion, but felt the category was an innocent one-a "neutral" one-
akin to blue skirts or red slippers. Yet, whatever the characterization of the
category, it had the effect of excluding this little girl because of how she
looked.
5 6
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 11.
5 1. SACKS, Colorblind Painter, supra note 14, at 1I.
52. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think
and Talk About Race Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 6 (1995) (footnotes omitted):
The transformation of color-blindness from prescriptive ideal into a condition of
societal denial first appeared in [the] anti-affirmative action cases and in the politics
that created those cases .... "Our Constitution is color-blind" becomes "We are a
color-blind society." Such an assertion can only be believed if we engage in
massive denial of what we see and hear every day.
53. Id. at 5-6.
54. Id. at 8; see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Colorblind, " 44
STAN. L. REv. I (1991). "Nonrecognition [of race] is not a common-sense solution to racism,
but a pathology which prevents recognition of the disease." Id. at 22 n.90.
55. Gotanda, supra note 54, at 21-23. "Nonrecognition [of race] fosters the systematic
denial of racial subordination and the psychological repression of an individual's recognition of
that subordination, thereby allowing such subordination to continue." Id. at 16 (footnote
omitted).
56. 1 tell this same story in a different context in Deconstruction, Reconstruction, We-
construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Racial Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the
19971
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Thus, the proclamation of a "colorblind law" obscures and excuses a
more basic lack of racial vision. Indeed, racism is often well-intentioned
and unconscious:
57
Judges are not immune from our culture's racism, nor can they
escape the psychological mechanisms that render us all, to some
extent, unaware of our racist beliefs. . . . Judges continue to
come primarily from elite white backgrounds. They undoubt-
edly share the values and perceptions of that subculture, which
may well be insensitive or even antagonistic toward the values,
58needs, and experiences of blacks and other minorities.
But whether it is lack of vision, lack of perspective, or simply lack of
will, the effect is the same. In the recent Hopwood v. Texas59 case, four
White applicants challenged a graduate school's admission policy. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held as unconstitutional the University of
Texas School of Law's admission policy. Under this policy, African- and
Mexican-American candidates were evaluated differently in order to admit
a class whose demographics reflect the graduating classes of Texas
undergraduate institutions. 60 The court reached this holding despite the in-
disputable fact-acknowledged by the Fifth Circuit-that the law school
had historically discriminated against Blacks. 61 What is striking, however,
is how the Fifth Circuit defined race. For the court, race was simply a
matter of appearance, an immutable physical characteristic having no larger
societal meaning other than physical size or blood type. The Fifth Circuit
saw racial diversity as "simply [achieving] a student body that looks differ-
ent.
, 62
Black/White Paradigm (unpublished manuscript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal).
57. See Charles R. Lawrence, Il. The Id. the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 339 (1987) (noting that racially prejudiced behavior
is often "experienced as a reflection of rational deduction from objective observation" and the
decision maker may often be "unaware of the selective perception that has produced her
stereotype").
58. Id. at 380. Discussing City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), in which
the Supreme Court struck down a minority set-aside program in Richmond, Virginia, Professor
Lawrence points out how the majority blinded themselves to the city's history of slavery and
segregation, which is still reflected in its schools and neighborhoods. Lawrence, supra note 52,
at 6-7. He posits that to discount the effect of that separation, the Justices had to deny their own
life experiences, living in environments and circumstances where Blacks were rarely
encountered. Id. at 7.
59. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc'y v.
Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
60. Id. at 934.
61. Id. at 953.
62. Id. at 945. They stated that the race of an applicant had no real meaning concluding,
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Race, however, is not simply a biological and immutable attribute
such as phenotype or skin color. On the contrary, "race is a socially
constructed, human category, not a natural or scientific one." 6 3 It is a con-
cept, albeit a powerful one, "which signifies and symbolizes social
conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies."
64
Indeed, the historical categorization of races in the United States has beenC, 65
arbitrary, fluid, and highly political. Thus, the meaning of race is
constructed by social context.
Although race is socially constructed and not an immutable biological
characteristic, it is nonetheless real. 67  The irony of Hopwood is that
ignoring the social and political implications of racial intercourse forced
the court to come full circle back to defining race as merely a circumstance
of skin color-a standard rejected as impracticable by the Supreme Court
seventy-five years ago.68  The very notion of racial colorblindness itself
casts race as a neutral and apolitical attribute. It leaves the analysis of race
"[s]uch a criterion is no more rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon the
physical size or blood type of applicants." Id.
63. Gotanda, supra note 54, at 23.
64, MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT. RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55
(1994) (emphasis omitted). A full discussion of the social construction of race is beyond the
scope of this article.
65. For a description of the fluidity of racial classifications, see Gotanda supra note 54, at
23-36. For Critical Race theorists, the focus is consequently upon "'how law was a constitutive
element of race itself: in other words how law constructed race." CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxv (1995) (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995) (hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
66. Race is "about a certain set of political and moral rights and obligations" arising from a
historical context. Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity. 2 AFR.-
AM. L. & POL. REP. 207, 212 (jointly with BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.) (1995). This is in contrast
to a notion of racial -'essentialism" which is the belief that there is a monolithic racial experience.
See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
588 (1990).
67. '[T]here is a material dimension and weight to the experience of being 'raced' in
American society, a materiality that in significant ways has been produced and sustained by law."
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 65, at xxvi; see also Jayne Chong-Soon Lee. Navigating
the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 771 (1994) (pointing out how theories that reduce
racial identities to ethnic ones hinder the ability to resist entrenched forms of racism (citing OMI
& WINANT, supra note 64, at 10, 21-24)); Turner, supra note 20.
Even at the most simple biological level, there are instances where dark skin shade may
reduce the odds of working by 52%. James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., Race Still
Matters, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 7, 1995, at A48 (reporting on research done regarding
the employment rates of men categorized by skin shade (dark, light, white) in Los Angeles,
California).
68. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922) (rejecting skin color as
"impracticable" for determining race since there were some Whites darker than "'persons of the
brown or yellow races"); see also Gotanda, supra note 54, at 30 n. 119 (discussing Ozawa and the
Court's rejection of skin color in determining who was a "white person").
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nowhere to go but a return to the already discredited notion of race as
simply a biological condition.
CONCLUSION
In the end, whether we call ourselves colorblind may be irrelevant
since the present reality of racial hierarchy will continue for the immediate
future irrespective of terminology. The ideological superstructure of racial
hierarchy rests on a more solid foundation than the labels chosen to obscure
its existence. Moreover, lawyers and legal scholars often inflate the impor-
tance and influence of our work in effectuating progressive social change.
As one scholar has observed, law's function may not be to promote the
evolution of social norms, but rather "to suppress deviation from those
norms.' 69 As such, the eradication of racial subordination will probably
have less to do with legal constructions, fictions, and abstractions, and
more to do with the results of grassroots political mobilization that the law
will dutifully and fitfully follow.
To the extent that legal constructions influence the public debate
regarding the direction and values of our society, it would be prudent to
heed the lessons of the island of the colorblind about how and what we
perceive about ourselves and the world around us. From these lessons we
might learn that a true "colorblind" constitutional analysis would "see" race
as a complex, textured, political phenomenon. We might also understand
that the appreciation of race-like the appreciation of color itself-cannot
be reduced to considerations of pigment and surface appearance alone.
This understanding could create the opportunity to explore more fully
racial hierarchy and its many dimensions. Indeed, we need to be constantly
reminded that there are still many lessons to be learned about how to
experience and change our collective condition because, while no birds
may sing on Guam, there is every reason to hope that in their absence we
may hear the crickets chirp more sweetly.
69. Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, 3 ASIAN L.J. 185, 202 (1996).
